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 Rethinking the Role of Government in
 Agri-Food Markets
 Julie A. Caswell
 The year 1996 marked the fiftieth anniversary
 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, a
 sweeping piece of legislation that forms a ma-
 jor underpinning for government activities to
 promote agricultural marketing in the United
 States. Beyond that law, much of domestic food
 and agricultural marketing policy and many of
 our institutions date back even further to the
 1920s and 1930s and have been recently
 viewed as outmoded to various degrees by dif-
 ferent people. What set of government market-
 ing policies fits the current and future agri-food
 system and is in the public interest? The ques-
 tion is one of optimal policy design, if such a
 thing can be defined effectively.
 Identifying the set of marketing policies that
 fits current and future conditions is a formi-
 dable task, requiring consideration of how mar-
 kets are operating and how they are likely to
 change in the future. The most difficult aspect
 of the task, however, is considering what are
 the performance standards to which we wish to
 hold the agri-food system, to what degree is
 some notion of fairness part of those standards,
 and, if fairness is important, what standard of
 fairness should we use?
 Valuable treatises have been written on these
 subjects. However, I propose to talk about them
 more informally. In a session on marketing or-
 ders at the 1994 meeting of the Food and Agri-
 cultural Marketing Consortium, Gary Fairchild
 posed the questions in this form: "If we did not
 have marketing orders today, would we want
 them, propose them? Could we get them ap-
 proved?" The second question is especially
 timely since the relative size of the agricultural
 sector is now smaller than when the programs
 were originally passed, and rationales for poli-
 cies have evolved as well (Gardner).
 Major Marketing Policies in Agri-Food
 Markets
 There is no definitive list of marketing policies
 for the agri-food system since marketing can be
 defined broadly or narrowly depending on the
 purpose and focus of the analysis. For our pur-
 poses I have chosen a broad definition to in-
 clude most policies that attempt to affect the
 price, quality, and disposition of agricultural
 products as they leave the farm and move
 through the food processing and distribution
 system to ultimate consumers. The list of major
 policy levers includes
 1. Price, situation, and outlook reports; other
 informational programs.
 2. Marketing orders.
 3. Grades, standards, and inspection services.
 4. Domestic and foreign advertising, promo-
 tion, and market development.
 5. Authorization and facilitation of cooperatives.
 6. Trade practice regulation.
 7. Antitrust policy.
 8. Food safety and nutrition regulation.
 9. Facilitation of research, particularly at
 USDA and land grant universities.
 Marketing policies operate in the context of
 broader sets of policies government uses to
 support (Congressional Budget Office) or limit
 business. These include policies on price/income
 supports to agriculture, taxes, credit availability
 and cost, and international trade.
 Is the Agri-Food Sector Special (Different)?
The bedrock issue to consider in rethinking the
 role of government in the future agri-food sys-
 tem in all policy areas, including marketing
 policy, is whether the agricultural, food pro-
 cessing, and food distribution sector is now,
 compared to the past, special or different in im-
 portant respects from other sectors of the
 economy. If it is, it may require or merit public
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 policies different from those used in the general
 economy. If not, it does not.
 My premise is that the agri-food system is
 not now generally special or different in mean-
 ingful ways that suggest the need for special-
 ized marketing policy. This premise rests on
 three arguments. First, farming as a business is
 not unique from many other small, medium,
 and large businesses run by individuals and cor-
 porations. While family farm values are real,
 family farming in its nostalgic form has largely
 faded. Nor are food processing and distribution
 industries unique in their characteristics. This
 does not imply that farmers, for example, do
 not face challenging and often difficult circum-
 stances in making a living from their occupa-
 tion. It simply says that a farmer faced with
 loss of market or tough competitive circum-
 stances is not different from a textile manufac-
 turer, restaurant owner, or service worker faced
 with a similarly tough situation. Either both or
 neither should be the focus of policy attention.
 Second, agricultural and food markets are in
 most cases mature enough to operate without a
 great deal of public support and policy input,
 especially when it is at significant variance
 with that experienced in other industries (Con-
 gressional Budget Office, Offutt). For example,
 the notion of orderly marketing of food prod-
 ucts is not without merit, but do we worry to
 the same extent about the orderly marketing of
 steel, televisions, or clothes? Every season,
 clothing stores mount big sales to dispose of
 stock that must only be the result of disorderly
 marketing of one kind or another. But we
 largely rely on markets to smooth out this dis-
 orderliness and do not view it as a government
 responsibility to assure that clothing stores earn
 a fair return on their investments.
 A third, related point is that agricultural and
 food products are obviously critically important
 as a necessity of human life. This special status
 does not, however, warrant special policies to
 control or influence demand and supply, al-
 though it does call for public policy to monitor
 and regulate some quality attributes such as
 safety. The United States can rely on its agri-
 cultural resource blessings and ability to buy on
 the world market to assure adequate supplies at
 affordable prices.
 Least I be misunderstood at this juncture, the
 above arguments are not in any way equivalent
 to a "markets always work perfectly" view of
 the world. What they say is that agricultural
 and food markets are not fundamentally differ-
 ent from other markets that require varying lev-
 els of regulation, monitoring, and facilitation in
 a free-market ec nomy. Thi  is not equivalent
 to arguing for unregulated agri-food markets
 since the United States uses a br ad array of
 policies to alter the operation of markets in all
 industries. It is arguing for comparable levels
 of ntervention. For example, fairness in a mar-
 ket may not require a pr ce support but may re-
 quire some government specification of market-
 ing institutions that seek to ensure a fair bar-
 gaining environment.
 Market Failure Paradigm and Its Limitations
 Government's role in the economy has been n-
 der intense scrutiny in recent years. Familiar ar-
 guments center around the weight of regulatory
 burdens, the scope of regulation, and whether
 certain policies are forms of corporate welfare.
 The government's role is ultimately judged
 based on the social and political consequences
 of its actions. There is also a continuing trend
 toward increased use of economic concepts and
 constructs in the evaluation process. In the first
 instance this involves a trend toward subjecting
 government policies and regulations to more
 consistent, stringent, and demanding benefit-
 cost tests (see, e.g., Belzer and Theroux).
 In the second instance, there is a trend toward
 a public policy philosophy of applying what I
 will call a "strict market failure test" to evaluat-
 ing government's role in markets. Here market
 failures stem from the existence of externali-
 ties, public goods, and common property re-
 sources. Under this approach, the government's
 role in markets is constrained to instances
 where there are bona fide market failures and it
 is reasonably certain that government action in
 the market will result in improved performance
 over the market with market failure and no gov-
 ernment role. What the strict market failure test
 ignores is a potential role for government in ad-
 dressing market imperfections such as market
 power and inadequate information. What it also
 ignores is that the test is not generally applied
 across all government policies and its selective
 application makes for inconsistent policy.
 Improved rationality in government policy
 can be pursued through use of consistent ben-
 efit-cost tests of policies intended to address
 cases of market failure, market imperfections,
 or undesired market outcomes. Applying ben-
 efit-cost criteria to marketing policy is often
 complicated because the policy is meant to in-
 fluence markets that for the most part already
 exist, although with possible imperfections. In
 many cases "correcting" the imperfection im-
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 plies a redistribution of value (e.g., income) be-
 tween the market participants. A further com-
 plication is that government may identify im-
 perfections that it could lessen by offering a
 service on a fee basis (e.g., quality certifica-
 tion) that competes with potential private pro-
 viders. Here judging the government role
 hinges on whether it has any special advantages
 (e.g., credibility, ability to control free riding,
 efficiency, competence) that argue for provid-
 ing the service in competition with private pro-
 viders.
 What Performance for Which Beneficiaries?
 What are the relevant performance dimensions
 for the agri-food marketing system? The tried
 and true economists' list with minor modifica-
 tions works well. This list includes (i) effi-
 ciency, including allocative and technical effi-
 ciency; (ii) equity, including the impact of
 changes in the organization of the food system
 on producers, processors, and consumers; (iii)
 technical progress, including the impact of in-
 formation systems on market performance; and
 (iv) availability of safe and nutritious food.
 Discussions of the target beneficiaries of
 public policy in the agricultural and food indus-
 tries tend to identify two groups. Consumers
 are nearly always identified as the beneficiaries
 in one way or another. Policies adopted must
 ultimately hinge on a rationale of improved
 food access, reliable supply, and/or lower
 prices. Farmers are the second, and some would
 argue the primary, target group of beneficiaries.
 This focus needs modification. As argued
 above, farmers are not uniquely different from
 other large or small businesspeople. The ulti-
 mate performance criterion should be refocused
 on the well-being of consumers, with a second-
 ary focus on the well-being of all market par-
 ticipants, including those working in farming,
 processing, and distribution. The agri-food
 system's claim to importance in the general
 economy is based on employment and sales in
 the entire vertical chain of distribution, but the
 target beneficiaries of agri-food programs are
 often limited to farmers and consumers. A
 broader focus would address this mismatch.
 Marketing Policy in the Future
 The current accepted wisdom (and reality) is
 that budget constraints, government downsiz-
 ing, and shifts in regulatory philosophy will
 continue to generate pressure to redefine the
 role of government in he agri-fo d system.
 This redefinition may have begun in earnest
 with the recent passage of the "Freedom to
 Farm" bill, although its ultimate impact is pres-
 ently unclear (Offutt, Tweeton). In this context
 of changing price/income support policies,
 there are several important forces that are key
 to judging the desirability of continuing or al-
 tering particular marketing policies in the fu-
 ture. How these trends are being analyzed and
 interpreted to justify regulation, or the lack
 thereof, is also of interest.
 Industrialization/Stronger Vertical Coordination/
 Contractual Exchange/Globalization
 The agri-food system is evolving to more
 closely resemble an industrialized system with
 consolidation of activity, more extensive reli-
 ance on contract production and vertical inte-
 gration, and more international trade (Schertz
 and Daft, Drabenstott, Hurt, Boehlje and
 Schrader). This evolution poses challenges in
 both analyzing the size and importance of these
 trends and their implications for the role of
 government.
 The most significant challenge industrializa-
 tion poses for policy is analyzing its causes.
 One theme that runs through many discussions
 of industrialization of the agri-food industries
 is that industrialization is driven by forces at
 the consumer level, e.g., demand for food prod-
 ucts with particular quality and price character-
 istics. I find this theme perplexing and largely
 unsupported. It implies that changes in horizon-
 tal and vertical market structure are dictated by
 consumer demand shifts that are minor in com-
 parison to the shifts in market structure and or-
 ganization. Market organization and structure
 are more determined by companies and their ef-
 forts to organize activities in a manner as prof-
 itable as possible, taking into consideration
 production and transaction costs, opportunities
 to create and use market power, and public
 policy.
 A related blind spot in many discussions of
 industrialization is an overemphasis on the im-
 portance of transaction costs in determining or-
 ganizational structure. It is as if after being
 overlooked for years, transactions costs are
 suddenly thought to be everything. They are
 clearly important, but are not everything. Un-
 derstanding the nature of industrialization is
 crucial to assessing the role of government in
 the new, more industrialized agri-food system.
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 An analytical approach that ignores relative
 market power and overemphasizes the role of
 transaction costs has a built-in tendency to see
 current market outcomes as ideal.
 Increased international trade and foreign di-
 rect investment in the agri-food system
 (Henderson, Handy, and Neff) also have an im-
 pact on the role of government policy. Trade
 agreements are increasingly guiding what is ac-
 ceptable policy at the national level as they try to
 produce freer trade by circumscribing subsidies
 and nontariff barriers to trade. But it is also the
 case that trade agreements are a blunt instru-
 ment for exercising this type of control, and
 governments continue to have great latitude.
 In terms of government's role, increased
 trade and foreign direct investment have an ef-
 fect similar to that of the forces that have been
 labeled industrialization. They tend to diminish
 the role of government in price/income support
 programs and emphasize its role in designing
 and facilitating market institutions.
 Shifts in Relative Market Power
 A major traditional rationale for a government
 role in agricultural marketing is to address situ-
 ations of unequal market power, particularly the
 perceived inferior bargaining power of farmers
 (Armbruster, Henderson, and Knutson, Padberg
 1994, 1995). The existence of unequal bargain-
 ing power due to monopsonistic or oligopsonis-
 tic market structures remains a very contentious
 issue in agriculture. Its prevalence and impor-
 tance are the subject of much recent analytical
 and empirical work (Peterson and Brooks,
 USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stock-
 yards Administration; Rogers and Sexton), as
 well as federal task force efforts (USDA Agri-
 cultural Marketing Service).
 The nature of this asymmetry in bargaining
 power differs in markets based on how much
 industrialization has occurred. Unequal bar-
 gaining power remains an issue in markets
 where industrialization has not taken place but
 the information environment remains richer in
 traditional market data. In markets where in-
 dustrialization has occurred or is in process, the
 nature of the bargaining problem has shifted.
 Contracts typically specify multiple process or
 product attributes in addition to price, making
 effective public reporting and monitoring diffi-
 cult. The potential is evident for processing
 companies to exploit their stronger market po-
 sition when facing producers with large fixed
 investments. It is important to note, however,
 returning to the question of whether agriculture
 is special or different, that situations of unequal
 bargaining power exist in many i dustri s where
 suppliers are captive to major buyers whose deci-
 sions influence their survival. If the similarities
 between agriculture and other industries in this re-
 spect outweigh the differences, then policies to
 address bargaining asymmetries should be sym-
 metric as well. If this is not the case, agricul-
 ture may merit unique marketing policies.
 Information Availability
 Information is generally becoming more easily
 accessible, with private services and web sites
 proliferating. However, significant information
 problems remain, for example, a lack of infor-
 mation on contract terms. Using Petzel's break-
 down, government information-related activi-
 ties in markets above the consumer level can be
 classified as (i) information that is publicly col-
 lected and paid for and (ii) information that is
 publicly collected and privately paid for (on a
 fee-for-service basis). In recent years, the
 former type of data has been decreasing in
 availability as the federal government has cut
 many programs. Of increasing importance as a
 public policy issue is a third type of informa-
 tion not delineated by Petzel: privately col-
 lected data that is sold to private users but may
 ot be available for public uses. Such data from
 private information services can be very useful
 for policy analysis but the services often refuse
 to sell it to public users.
 The central issue that information poses for
 federal marketing policy is the amount and
 form of marketing information that should be
 acquired and disseminated. This choice be-
 comes more important as (or if) the government
 withdraws from more traditional agricultural
 programs because information provision may
 be the most effective way to monitor and influ-
 ence the operation of markets at a relatively
 low cost.
 Role of Government in Agri-Food Markets
 Using a broad brush, my assessment of the role
 of g vernment marketing policies in the future
 gri-food system is summarized below. This as-
 sessment is based on the arguments that the
 agri-food sector is not different from other sec-
 tors of the economy and should have a compa-
rable level of government policy involvement;
 government policy should address market fail-
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 ures, market imperfections, and other undesired
 market outcomes; and consumers should be the
 primary beneficiary of policy, with producers,
 processors, and distributors being the second-
 ary beneficiaries. Based on these arguments and
 trends in the agri-food system, my score sheet
 on government policies can be summed up as
 follows:
 Programs to Phase Out
 1. Marketing orders, with exception noted below.
 2. Information programs that could be pro-
 vided by private services or that do not sup-
 port (a) governmental decision making or
 (b) fair operation of markets.
 3. Advertising, promotion, and market develop-
 ment beyond cooperative efforts noted below.
 Programs to Keep
 1. Information programs that support (a) govern-
 mental decision making or (b) fair operation of
 markets. This includes programs to assure rea-
 sonable public access to privately collected
 data that is widely sold to private buyers.
 2. Marketing orders that focus on assessments
 for research, advertising, and promotion.
 3. Authorization and some facilitation of coop-
 eratives and bargaining associations. The
 role of the government should be to provide
 opportunities for farmers and contract grow-
 ers to band together, subject to the require-
 ment that they are not able to exercise mar-
 ket power any more strongly than other mar-
 ket participants. In other words, economy-
 wide standards of antitrust violation should
 be applied. To justify policy asymmetry for
 agriculture (the same opportunities not be-
 ing actively provided in other industries),
 credible arguments for differences in agri-
 culture have to be made. Alternatively, the
 same opportunities could be offered to simi-
 larly situated participants in other industries.
 4. Some trade practice regulation.
 5. Antitrust policy.
 6. Food safety and nutrition regulation.
 7. Facilitation of research, although further
 downsizing may be warranted.
 Programs to Offer on a Fee-for-Service Basis
 (Where Private Alternatives Are Inferior)
 1. Grades, standards, and inspection services to
 support them should be offered in competi-
 tion with private services as long as there is
 a demand for he service (e.g., fo  grading
 services that the gov rnment is more cred-
 ible in providing than private suppliers), fee
 revenue covers cost , and the government is
 technically able and has the resources to
 lead rather than lag developments in the
 market.
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